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Abstract
We construct a new, direct measure of female autonomy in household decision-
making by creating an index from the principal components of a variety of household
variables on which mother of a child takes decision. We then examine its impacts
on her child's secondary education in Mexico and nd that the children of Mexican
mothers with greater autonomy in domestic decision making have higher enrolment
in and lower probability of dropping out of secondary school. We use the relative
proximity of spousal parents as instruments for relative autonomy to ameliorate the
potential endogeneity between autonomy and welfare outcomes. We argue that omitted
variables that may drive education and autonomy are likely to be uncorrelated with
the ones driving location choice of families given the migration patterns in Mexico.
However, the positive autonomy eect is weaker and non-existent for older children
and for girls suggesting that gender-directed conditional cash transfer policies may not
necessarily hasten educational and gender transition in the process of development.
Keywords: Female Empowerment, Principal Component, Education, Instrumental Vari-
able
JEL Codes: D1, I2, J1
This paper has benetted from the comments of Paul Dower and seminar participants at the Delhi School
of Economics, India and Berliner Netzwerk Arbeitsmarktforschung (BeNA), Germany. All remaining errors
are ours. Comments are welcome. Please email comments to tchakraborty@diw.de or pde@ccny.cuny.edu
1 1 Introduction
Is greater mother autonomy in decision-making within the family associated with better child
outcomes? Using a new, direct measure of female autonomy, and exploiting the longitudinal
nature of the Mexican Family Life Survey, we nd evidence that greater mother autonomy
in household decision-making is associated with a higher probability of secondary school
enrolment and retention. This eect, however, is more pronounced for boys and gets weaker
for older children disappearing eventually.
Female autonomy in economic and other decision making has been at the forefront of
academic and policy research over the last decade.1 In the context of both developed and
developing countries, it has been found that the eect of a dollar that is earned by a female
member of a family is dierent from those of a dollar earned by a male member. Except
for a few recent studies, evidence overwhelmingly fails to reject the conjecture that female
members take decisions that are generally benecial to the family members, particularly chil-
dren, in the conventional economic sense - female autonomy leads to a reduction in fertility,
a rise in birth-weight, and an increase in survival rates to name a few.2 Taking this cue
from academic ndings, several countries have implemented policies that are geared towards
empowering women ranging from micro-credit lending to reservation in the legislature to
conditional cash payments.3
Measuring female autonomy empirically has always been a challenge, particularly from
observed non-experimental data. Researchers have either used transitory income or condi-
1Female autonomy has been researched in various contexts. Some notables being (1) autonomy in house-
hold decision (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Kantor 2003), (2) autonomy in political participation in devel-
oping countries(Chattopadhyay and Duo, 2004) and (3)autonomy in contraceptive use and labor market
participation in the United States (Goldin and Katz, 2000)
2See Kantor (2003) and Rahman and Rao (2004)
3These range from micro-credit lending, to reservation in the legislature to conditional cash payments.
2tional cash transfer programs as proxies for female autonomy in reduced form equations or
have conducted randomized experiments to remove selection and other biases.4 However,
one known problem with these approaches, particularly the former, is that the inter-personal
gendered dynamics among family members, particularly the parents, when decision regarding
their child's human capital in concerned, remains unobservable to the researchers.5 There-
fore, even if a dollar goes to the female member, we cannot know if the spending decision
is taken of her own volition or at the behest of her husband (and in some countries other
family members who co-habit such as in-laws).
We create a direct measure of female autonomy constructed from the responses of each
member of a couple regarding their own and partner's decision making with respect to a set of
decision variables such as child schooling and food expenditure. Mexican Family Life Survey
(henceforth, MxFLS) collects data on individual decision-making regarding various family
matters by interviewing each adult in the family such that the husband independently gives
his opinion about who takes the decision- himself, his spouse or both. Therefore, the setting is
ideal to measure female autonomy \dened as the ability of women to make choices/decisions
within the household relative to their husbands"(Anderson and Eswaran, 2009). However,
working with twelve variables can be cumbersome and confusing. Therefore, we have reduced
the dimensionality of the decision matrix by taking the principal component of the same and
creating an index for female autonomy. This approach has several other advantages. First,
it is a continuous, time-variant measure that gives a range of autonomy. Second, it takes on
the issue of decision-making directly, instead of inferring from indirect proxy measures such
4Thomas (1990) was one of the rst to point out that income eects across gender may be dierent.
There is a vast literature that followed. Ashraf(2009) conducted a eld experiment in Philippines where
private and public behaviors of spouses were tracked to elicit dierential spousal behavior. It also includes
an excellent review of the intra-household decision-making literature.
5Anderson and Eswaran (2009) address this issue to some extent and nd that income earned outside
family farm generates greater autonomy.
3as access to transitory or transfer income. Third, with more and more surveys asking such
questions, this measure is easily replicable.6 We then use our autonomy index to examine the
eects of female autonomy on children's education, particularly enrolment and retention at
the secondary school level. Mexico is at a stage of development where, except for some remote
rural areas, primary schooling has been almost universal. Therefore, primary enrolment is
likely to be invariant to the parental characteristics. However, secondary enrolment and
completion have lagged much behind primary enrolment and completion and students have
a tendency to drop out of secondary school (Angelucci et al.,2009). Therefore, a mother's
autonomy in family decision-making is more likely to inuence secondary enrolment.7
Our identication strategy proceeds in two parts. First, we exploit the longitudinal nature
of the data by using lagged values for independent variables. Second, we use instrumental
variables to address the possibility of the results being driven by omitted unobserved vari-
ables. Borrowing insight and evidence from the sociological and anthropological literature,
we use the relative locations of husband and wife's parents as a determinant of mother's
autonomy. This is a valid instrument if it induces variations in mother's autonomy but
is uncorrelated with other individual characteristics that aect both female autonomy and
schooling of children. We nd that relative proximity does signicantly explain autonomy.
While proximity to only wife's parents is likely to raise her autonomy, it might also
improve child outcomes independently through greater child care. Hence we use we have
used relative closeness to mother's vis-a-vis father's parents. There is no a priori reason why
a child's paternal grandparent will care about her more(less) than her maternal grandparents.
6For example, Demographic Health Survey has been asking these questions for all its rounds. However,
DHS asks these decision questions only to the female members of a family.
7In this paper we use female and mother interchangeably since we restrict our sample of children whose
both parents are alive. However, the idea of using principal components for constructing an autonomy index
can be extended to any woman within a family.
4Further concerns regarding the exogeneity of the instrumental variable arise if the same
individual characteristics inuence both whether grandparents locate themselves close to
their grandchildren's families and aect child outcomes. We utilize information on the birth
location of grandparents to construct our instrument. To the extent that birth locations
are exogenous, our model is identied by the correlation between birth location and current
location of grandparents. Moreover, we provide further evidence that, in Mexico, individuals
do not principally move to relocate themselves close to family or to get away from them.
Migration decisions are mainly driven by employment and education considerations. Hence
our ndings indicate that while relative grandparental proximity is a strong predictor of
mother's autonomy, it is unlikely that variations in grandparental proximity are correlated
with unobserved characteristics that aect child outcomes. Identication issues have been
discussed in more detail in section 4.
We nd that higher mother autonomy is generally associated with higher secondary school
enrollment and retention. However, these eects are more signicant for boys who are in
their pre and early teens. For older boys, the autonomy eects get weaker. For instance, our
estimates suggest that if the decision regarding child's education is taken by mothers instead
of fathers, the probability of dropout decreases by 1.62 percentage points for boys in the 10-14
age group. Moreover, boys seem to gain at the expense of girls within the mixed-sex-sibling
families.8 There are no eects of autonomy on boys for families with only sons. Finally, our
analysis also sheds light on the mechanism through which benets from higher autonomy
of mothers accrue dierently to boys and girls.Our ndings have important implications for
the new trend in global development policy - conditional cash or in-kind transfers handed
out directly to the female member of a family. This is particularly relevant in Mexico, the
8Changing one decision leads to a change in the value of the index leading to a change in outcome variable.
This is discussed in detail in section 5.
5country under study here, which implemented Progresa in 1999 and is currently carrying
out the newer version of the program, Oportunidades - programs that give cash to families
conditional on children's education and health outcomes.9 Our work is also located within
the strand of literature that rejects the unitary model of household a la Becker(1991) and
questions whether income is not fungible. The theoretical question is whether household
decisions are a result of utility maximization by a representative agent, or of a bargaining
process between various members of the household, notably between husband and wife as far
as decisions regarding the household resource allocation are concerned. If household welfare
outcomes are sensitive to women's autonomy in intra-household decision- making, there is
further evidence against the unitary model.10
However, while one of our ndings rejects the unitary model, other ndings caution
against the ambitious policies directed towards women. The relevant policy question is
whether redistribution of resources from a male to a female member would improve the
welfare outcome for children. We show that it may not necessarily be the case even when
the women in the family themselves choose how to spend the money.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the Mexican Family Life Survey
dataset in the next section. Then we present the logic of using principal component analysis
to form a measure of female autonomy in section 3. The following two sections specify our
empirical model and identication strategy and discuss our empirical ndings respectively.
We conclude our paper by summarizing our ndings and discussing their policy implications.
9Examples of conditional cash transfer programs abound. Apart from the Oportunidades, there are Bono
de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) in Ecuador (Paxson and Schady, 2007) and Familias en Accin in Colombia
(Attanasio et al., 2006)
10We use \household welfare" and \child welfare" interchangeably in this paper as children welfare has
arguably been the most prominent focus of the researchers and policy-makers. In the rest of the paper, we
talk about our specic welfare measures - secondary school retention and domestic child labor.
62 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) - a nationally representative
longitudinal household survey in Mexico. There are two waves of the data. The rst one
took place in 2002, and a sizeable proportion of individuals were tracked in 2005 resulting
in a two-year panel.11
The survey contains detailed information on a wide range of individual and household
characteristics, including household demographics, dwelling characteristics,household nan-
cial and non-nancial assets, household member income and education levels (thereby helping
us construct parental education), household consumption and household labor supply. In
addition, as expounded in more detail in the next section, the survey interviews each adult
member of the household about various aspects of household decision-making allowing us to
look into the black box of intra-household decision-making and power-sharing. Finally, there
is information on spatial characteristics such as municipality, locality and urbanity allowing
us to include spatial xed eects in our specications.
Please insert Table 1 here
Table 1 provides some basic characteristics of the data. There are 8044 households
surveyed in 2002 and 8114 in 2005, respectively. Roughly 20% of the households are female-
headed suggesting that decision-making power within a family still lies mostly with men.
Additionally, only 20% of the female household heads are married implying that these women
run the family because they do not have a husband. This information is probably banal in
the context of most developing countries, but supports the fact in our context that women
lack autonomy in decision making as a cultural default and a variation in such autonomy and
11It is dicult to calculate the exact attrition rate as the rate varies depending on the relevant sample we
choose in terms of age and cohort.
7its implications are no trivial questions. Female household heads also have signicantly lower
education. While roughly 40% of the male household heads have secondary education, the
number is only 27% for the female household heads. A similar trend is present for workforce
participation. Roughly speaking, the female workforce participation rate is about half of the
male counterpart. Together, these statistics show us that Mexican families surveyed here
are similar to the general experience of gender imbalance in developing countries - women
study less, work more at home and for less wage income, and are less likely to run families
while a man is alive and present.
Please insert Table 2 here
Table 2 proles primary and secondary school enrollment for children aged between 5
and 16 years. Not surprisingly, primary enrollment is almost universal at more than 96%,
but secondary enrollment has lagged behind, both for 2002 and 2005. 12 Interestingly, while
primary enrollment rate is slightly higher for girls in the age group of 10-12 years, it is less
than the boys in the next age group of 13-16 years suggesting that proportionally more girls
drop out at the secondary level.
3 Measuring Female Autonomy - A Principal Compo-
nent Approach
The MxFLS survey includes questions on various decision making aspects which are asked
to both male and female adult members of the household. In our case, we consider decision-
making only by the adult members who have children. In other words, we are interested in
12his is consistent with the aggregate, country-level data reported by World Bank (WDI, 2010). According
to this database, net primary enrolment was 97.22% and 97.78% respectively for 2002 and 2005. However,
secondary enrolment was only 61.65% in 2002, but grew to 67.57% in 2005.
8the decision-making of parents, and consequently, various outcomes of their children. We
consider the decisions made on the following 12 categories: household food consumption,
husband's clothes, wife's clothes, child's clothes, child's education, child's health, and ex-
penditure on durable, transfers made to parents or relatives of the husband, transfers made
to parents or relatives of the wife, husband's labor force participation, wife's labor force
participation and the use of contraceptives.
Each household member is asked about his/her perception of who takes the decision
in each of these categories, but we focus only on the responses of the parents in cases
where both parents are alive. Moreover, we construct the female autonomy indices based on
father's responses rather than the mother's perception. In other words, our index, Mother's
Autonomy Index (henceforth, MAI) can be thought of as an indicator of the degree of
autonomy the husband is willing to give his wife.13
For any parent-child-combination, i, we assume that with respect to a particular decision
category, female autonomy is strongest when husband(i) perceives that his wife(i) takes
the decision in that category. On the other hand, female autonomy is weakest when the
husband(i) perceives that he himself takes the decision in that category. The perception that
both are involved in decision making lies somewhere in between. One way of computing an
index would be to compute the average proportion of categories in which the husband thinks
his wife takes the decision. However, this method assumes equal weight for all categories
in determining overall bargaining power within the marriage, which need not be the case.
For example, the husband can choose to let the wife decide on her own about her clothes,
13MxFLS is somewhat unique in asking these questions to both husbands and wives. Other surveys such as
DHS and ENADID in Mexico ask these questions to only the female members of the family. We believe that
in a mostly patriarchal society (see our discussion about households being mostly headed by male members),
a male member's perception about the decision making autonomy of female members is a more accurate
measure of female autonomy than their own perception of self-autonomy.
9probably a less important category, but keep her decision to work to himself. Hence we adopt
an alternative strategy and let the variability in the data decide how much weight to put
on each category.14 For each decision category, we create a categorical variable that equals
3 when the husband thinks that his wife takes the decision, equals 2 when he thinks that
both take the decision and equals 1 when he thinks that he takes the decision. We use factor
analysis to determine the weights that each decision category is assigned. We then use the
rst principal component as a measure of female autonomy as perceived by her husband. In
our sample, the rst principal component explains about 25% of the variability in the data.
3.1 Method
Intuitively, the principal components approach helps reduce dimensionality of the data and
yet capture the underlying variability. It produces mutually orthogonal linear combinations
(eigenvectors) of a set of variables that capture the common pattern in the data. The
eigenvector that has the highest eigenvalue, (i.e. the linear combination that captures the
highest variability) is the rst principal component. Formally, the strategy underlying the
principal component methodology is the following: Suppose we have k variables for k decision
categories that together determine the bargaining power of the spouse within the marriage.
Consider the following linear combinations:
14Nevertheless, we check the robustness of our results with average number of categories in which the
mother takes decisions as a measure of her autonomy.
10z1 =a11  x1 + a12  x2 + ::: + a1k  xk
z2 =a21  x1 + a22  x2 + ::: + a2k  xk
zk =ak1  x1 + ak2  x2 + ::: + akk  xk
Where xk is the variable denoting who takes decision in the kth category. In our case,
k 2 f1;2;;12g and x 2 f1;2;3g. For example, suppose category two is child's education.Then
x2 takes a value 3 if only the mother takes decision about her child's education. Likewise,
x2 takes a value 1 for the household where only the father decides about the child's edu-
cation.Principal components maximizes the variance V (z1) subject to the restriction that
a0
1a1=1 The normalization of eigenvectors ai to unity is done because if any z1 (eigenvalue)
maximizes V (z1) any other vector nz1 will also have the same property. Thus principal
component analysis minimizes the sum of the squared perpendicular distances unlike OLS
that minimizes the sum of vertical distances. z1 is called the rst principal component and
is the linear combination that has the highest variance. In a similar way we can nd the kth
principal component, the vector Xak , which maximizes z0
kzk subject to the normalization
a0
kak=1 and subject to the additional restriction that these principal components are orthog-
onal to each other. The variances of the k principal components decrease from 1 through k.
i.e. V (zk 1) > V (zk).15 Table 3 provides a summary of the index in our sample. The mean
value of the index is zero by construction. The standard deviation is 1.63. Recall that each
decision category takes a value of 1, 2 or 3 depending on whether only father decides, both
15An ad hoc strategy to construct an index of the mother's autonomy would be to set the weights aij = 1
(for all i and j) and hence use the average of all categories. We use that index for testing the robustness of
our results.
11parents decide or only mother decides, respectively.
Please insert Table 3 here
Thus, if a category moves from the 1 to 2 (or 2 to 3), the index increases by the amount
of its weight. For example, the index of female autonomy increases by approximately 0.87
units when the decision about child's education is taken by both parents as opposed to only
by the father. However, female autonomy is higher by (0.87*2) 1.8 units when the decision
is taken only by the mother as opposed to only by the father. In other words, as explained
before, the weights in column 4 indicate the relative importance of each category in the
construction of the index, where they are themselves determined by their variability in the
data. Thus, a child's education decision seems to be the most important variable with regard
to female empowerment, followed by decisions about child health.
3.2 Validation
One way to validate whether our index truly reects female autonomy within marriage is
to check its association with other measures of bargaining power or female autonomy that
have been used in the literature. While there is a dearth of direct measures of female
empowerment, the literature on power sharing within marriage outlines several important
correlates of female bargaining power viz. parental education, outside options (employment
status) and parental age among other things.
Table 4 illustrates the relationship between various parental characteristics and our index
of female autonomy. Specically if we compare the high (75th percentile) and low ends (25th
percentile) of the distribution of the female autonomy index, we nd that in households where
mothers have a greater autonomy in decision making, they are also more likely to have
12completed secondary education, younger in age and slightly more likely to be employed.
The same is true for father's characteristics.
Please insert Table 4 here
However, we do not nd a signicant dierence in urbanization between households with
high and low female autonomy.
3.3 Mother's Autonomy and Child Education - Stylized Facts
Given the strong evidence on the validity of our index, we next turn to our second question
in the paper - whether mother's autonomy in decision making aects child outcomes. The
basic idea behind our regression strategy is illustrated in table 5. It shows mean education
and employment of the children for high and low degrees of mother's autonomy in decision
making.
Please insert Table 5 here
As before, high and low are dened as greater-than-75th and lower-than-25th percentile of the
distribution of MAI, respectively. As shown earlier, enrollment drops signicantly as children
progress from lower to higher secondary. However, a comparison of rows 1 and 2 show that
the drop in enrollment is much higher for lower levels of Mother's Autonomy. For male
children, while enrollment drops by 24 percentage points in households with higher Mother's
Autonomy, it drops by 32 percentage points in households in the bottom 25 percent of the
Mother's Autonomy distribution, similarly for girls. However, this is a descriptive snapshot
of the data, without controlling for other relevant variables.
134 Regression Specication and Identication Strategy
4.1 Eects of Mother's Autonomy on her child's Retention in sec-
ondary school
While the evidence in Table 5 suggests that children with more autonomous mothers have
a higher rate of secondary enrollment on an average, it does not imply any causal link.
Omitted variables may drive both education choice and mother's autonomy. Hence, we turn
to a formal analysis to see if there exists a causal relationship between mother's autonomy
and child outcomes. We rst look at the secondary enrollment outcome of the students in
2005 with the lagged value of mother's autonomy from 2002 to ameliorate the simultaneity
problem.16 However, this measure can be imprecise because it includes students who were
never enrolled in the rst place in 2002, the year from which the autonomy index variable
comes. Therefore, we also look at secondary enrollment of students who are 10-14 years old
in 2005 conditional on the criterion that they were enrolled in school in 2002, either primary
or secondary. Accordingly, if a student is not enrolled in secondary school in 2005, then she
is categorized as a dropout. We also control for several candidate alternative explanations
cited in the literature such as wealth and parental education.
Formally we start with estimating the non-linear regression equations of the following
form:
Oi;2005 = 0 + 1  MAIi;2002 + Xi   + ui; (1)
where for each individual child i, Oi;2005 is the respective binary outcome variable,
16Since our dependent variable is binary, using an individual xed-eects model is problematic as pointed
out by Fernandez-Val (2009).
14MAIi;2002 is the measure of mother's autonomy within family in 2002, and X is the matrix
of control variables that includes various individual, parental and household characteristics
such as gender, age, family wealth and parental education. Our main coecient of interest
is beta1, in terms of the direction of change. We provide the marginal coecients from the
latent model to understand the magnitude of the eect. As discussed above, Oi;2005 repre-
sents secondary enrollment dummy in the rst specication, which is equal to unity if the
relevant child is enrolled in school in 2005; it represents secondary dropout in the second
specication where it is equal to unity if the relevant child is not enrolled in school in 2005,
but was enrolled in 2002, either at the primary or at the secondary level.
4.2 Instrumental Variable Strategy
While using a lagged value of MAI by exploiting the panel structure of the data accounts for
any concerns of simultaneity, it cannot address the possibility of omitted variable biases. To
account for both measurement error and omitted variable biases, we construct an instrumen-
tal variable by combining insights from the other social science literature with the pattern
of domestic migration in Mexico.17 Our instrumental variable strategy is based on the twin
observation that proximity to natal kin increases female bargaining power within her family,
and forces behind location choice of agents are exogenous to the autonomy-child education
relationship. In particular, the MxFLS asks all adult household members whether their
parents were born in the same locality (in geographic terms, this is a subcategory of munici-
17The previous literature has used a wide range of variables as exogenous determinants of female autonomy
or bargaining position of female within marriage. For example, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) use relative
income while Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) use non labor income as proxy for bargaining power. Others
have used current or inherited assets (Doss 1999, Quisumbing 1994). Brown (2009) uses dowry to proxy
for bargaining position and then goes on to instrument dowry by grain shocks. However, most of these
methods make strong assumptions about exogeneity. Finally, there are studies that use changes in divorce
laws or other exogenous policies to proxy for female bargaining position. (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997;
Chiappori, Fotin and Lacroix 2002).
15pality) as they currently live in or whether they were born in a dierent locality. Husband's
parents are proximate if the couple lives in the same locality as where the husband's parents
were born. On the other hand, wife's parents are proximate if the couple lives in the same
locality as where the wife's parents were born.18 We construct relative parental proximity
as a categorical variable that takes the value 3 when only wife's parents are proximate, the
value 2 when both husband's and wife's parents are proximate or none is proximate and it
takes the value 1 when only husband's parents are proximate. For example, we dene wife's
parents to be proximate when either the wife's mother, or her father or both live in the same
locality. Husband's parental proximity is dened similarly.
Sociological and anthropological literature has long documented that proximity to the na-
tal kin inuences women's position within marriage. For example, Dyson and Moore (1983),
argue that patrilocal kinship structures like village exogamy in marriage leads to lower au-
tonomy of women. By contrast, matrilocal kinship systems endow greater autonomy to
women. Yanca and Low (2004) and Chen (2004) provide evidence in dierent contexts that
geographic proximity to the natal kin positively inuences various indicators of female em-
powerment like control over household resources or household work arrangement. Therefore,
empirically, relative proximity of the wife's parents should be positively correlated with her
autonomy. However, to be a valid instrument, the proximity measure should be excluded
from the structural equation - i.e. proximity should not directly aect the outcome variable,
nor should parental proximity be determined simultaneously with female autonomy.
It is conceivable that proximity to wife's parents can improve child outcomes not only
through an her improved bargaining position but also through care-giving from maternal
grandparents to grandchildren. On the other hand proximity to husband's parents may have
18This is the minimum spatial unit in the survey.
16a similar independent eect on child outcomes other than the eect through the lowering the
bargaining position of the wife. However, a , relative proximity measure is likely to aect
child outcomes only through MAI since there is no a priori reason to believe that there exists
systematically dierential care-giving to grandchildren from the two sets of grandparents.
To understand the other threats to the exogeneity of our instrument concerns, rst con-
sider the case that proximity to respective parents might be determined as a result of selective
migration of spouses towards or away from their respective parents. However, investigating
the reasons for movement within Mexico, we nd that employment is the most important
determinant of migration for the adult members of the household (please refer to Appendix
Table A1). With motive of moving close to or away from family explaining only 1% of overall
adult migration in Mexico, it is unlikely that our instrument of relative proximity is deter-
mined by systematic migration of spouses towards their respective parents. Moreover, note
that for the instrument to be invalid, the husband (wife) must choose to relocate away from
his own parents and specically locate closer to his wife's (husband's) parents. In general,
this appears to be an unlikely scenario.
Finally, our IV would also fail if proximity is determined by the current location of
grandparents who endogenously choose to move to a locality where adult sons or daughters
currently live. For example, parents of a pro-active wife could choose to move close by raising
her autonomy level. The omitted variable, \pro-activeness" of the wife might aect both
parental proximity and child outcomes in this case.
Thus in order to avoid estimates that are contaminated by endogenous living locations of
grandparents, identifying instrument is based on exogenous birth locations of grandparents.
Since birth locations are arguably exogenous and are correlated with current locations of
grandparents, our model is identied by this correlation of current locations to birth loca-
17tions. We dene husband's parents to be proximate if the couple lives in the same region as
where the husband's parents were born. On the other hand, wife's parents are proximate if
the couple lives in the same region as where the wife's parents were born.
Next we provide evidence on the \relevance" of our instruments - that relative parental
proximity of spouses and MAI are indeed correlated.
Please insert Table 6 here
Table 6 shows the eect of the relative proximity of wife's parents to husband's parents on
the index of female autonomy. Relative proximity of wife's parents has a signicant positive
impact on the relative decision making power of wives and the coecient remains unchanged
with the inclusion of various controls. Moreover, as the last column shows, when we separate
out the indicators of wife's parent's proximity and husband's parent's proximity, it is the
proximity of the former that increase female autonomy; female autonomy decreases when of
husband's parents live nearby (however, the coecient is imprecisely estimated). Given that
our relative proximity measure strongly predicts MAI we present Two Stage Least Square
(TSLS) estimates of model (1) to allay any endogeneity concerns arising from unobserved
heterogeneity.
5 Discussion of Results
5.1 Secondary Enrollment
Probit estimates of the eects of mother's autonomy on child's secondary school enrollment
status are shown in table 7. The estimates are provided separately for lower secondary (10-14)
and higher secondary (15-16) age groups. The estimates in column 1 suggest that mother's
18autonomy is positively and signicantly associated with enrollment in the lower secondary
school. However MAI does not seem to matter for education status at upper secondary
levels (column 4). As expected, enrollment decreases at higher ages. Father's education
seems to be a robust predictor of overall secondary enrollment. Surprisingly, wealth, proxied
by landholding, does not have an eect on secondary enrollment.
Please insert Table 7 here
Moreover, when we decompose the sample into boys and girls, only boys seem to benet
from greater autonomy of mothers. MAI does not have a signicant impact on secondary
schooling for girls in either of the age categories. The marginal estimates corresponding to
the probit estimates in Column 2 are reported in Column 1 of Table 11. The estimates
suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in MAI leads to 1.3 percentage point increase in
probability of secondary enrollment for a child whose mother has mean MAI.19
5.2 Secondary Dropout
Table 8 reports the educational status of the child in 2005 conditional on the fact that she
was enrolled in school in 2002. In particular, our dependent variable is the probability of
dropping out while still in the school going age.20 As before, columns 1-3 show results for
children who are 10-14 years old and columns 4-6 show results of children aged 15 and 16
years.
Please insert Table 8 here
19All marginal eects are calculated at the mean value of MAI and the results are summarized in Table
11 to avoid clutter.
20Note that from the conventional point of view, dropout being equal to unity is the undesirable outcome,
opposite to enrollment.
19Mother's autonomy index has a negative and signicant impact on dropout from sec-
ondary school in the 10-14 age group but has no eect on higher secondary schooling. Again
this result holds only for boys, not for girls. In this case, the marginal eects imply that a
one unit increase in MAI leads to a 1 percentage point fall in the dropout rate (Table 11,
column 2).
5.3 Results Using Instrumental Variables
We now turn to the instrumental variable estimates. As argued above, our measure of rela-
tive grandparental proximity induces variations in MAI but is uncorrelated with underlying
variables that aect both schooling and MAI. The instrumental variable estimates are re-
ported in table 9 (enrollment) and table 10 (dropout). We restrict our attention to the
younger age group, because as shown above, education outcomes at the higher levels remain
indierent to variations in mother's autonomy.
Please insert Table 9 here
Please insert Table 10 here
Please insert Table 11 here
The IV estimates conrm that greater mother's autonomy leads to higher enrollment
and lower dropout for boys. The marginal eects for the enrollment and dropout results
are reported in column 3 and 4 respectively of Table 11. To understand the magnitude
of the eect, consider the dropout results in column 4. Overall, a one percentage point
increase in MAI implies a 3 percentage point fall in the dropout rate. In particular, a shift
in the decision making power from fathers to mothers, in the category of child's education
20for instance, reduces the probability of dropping out from school by 5.7 percentage points.
21 All IV coecients are larger than their probit counterparts. Given the nature of potential
omitted variable bias in this situation, it is not straightforward to form a prior as to which
way the probit estimates will be biased. For example, suppose the omitted variable from
equation (1) is the relevant student's IQ, a staple variable in the labor literature. It is not
straightforward if this leads to higher autonomy for the mother (where the father wants to
give more decision space to wife, or wants more autonomy for himself). However, since our
IV estimates are bigger than the probit estimates for both outcome variables, it may be
the case that for more able children, the father takes over the decision-making (so that the
correlation between IQ and mother's autonomy will be negative creating a downward bias for
the positive probit estimates). Contrary to the boys, IV results for girls in lower secondary
school (Column 2, Table 10) imply that higher mother's autonomy leads to higher dropout
rates for girls. At rst glance this might appear to be counter intuitive. However, a closer
look reveals that intra household dynamics might be driving the results. We deal with this
issue in further details in section 7.















Let us consider the category education (i=5).
In this category, w5 = 0:87 (from author's calculation). If d5
3 changes from 1 to 3 (decision taken by father
alone to decision taken by mother alone), then MAI increases by 0.87*2 = 1.8 units. To see the eventual
impact on dropout, let us consider the estimated marginal eect from the IV regression for boys in the 10-14
age group i.e. for 1 = 0:322. i.e. a 10 percentage point increase in MAI results in a 3 percentage point
reduction in the dropout rate. Therefore, a switch in decision-making power, for child's education, in favor
of the mother leads to 5.7 (1.8*3.2) percentage points decline in the probability of dropout.
216 Robustness Checks
In this section, we perform a couple of sensitivity analysis to see if our results are robust to
various alternative denitions of mother's autonomy. In particular, we construct an index of
mother's autonomy using two alternative approaches: (i) from the responses of the mothers
(as is more common in literature) and (ii) the average number of all categories in which the
mother takes decisions within the family.
6.1 Index using mothers' responses
Evidence from MxFLS survey shows that not only are the actual decisions taken by dierent
members of the family, but also perceptions dier with respect to who takes decision in
particular categories. Hence mother's response to questions of who takes household decisions
do not necessarily match that of father's response. Therefore, we construct the same index
using the mother's responses and estimate the same model. The results are presented in
Table 12
Please insert Table 12 here
Table 12 is estimated in the same way as Table 9, controlling for all relevant variables
as before. Results from Probit and IV estimations are reported in Column (1) and (2)
respectively. The results are qualitatively the same as before - greater autonomy of mothers
leads to lower dropout for sons and, IV estimates are higher than the Probit results.
226.2 Index using average number of categories
As discussed above, a more common approach in this literature is to work with average
number of categories in which a mother takes the decision as a measure of her autonomy.22
Panel B in Table 12 presents results from estimating the same model with the Mother
Autonomy Index being calculated as proportion of cases in which the mother of a child takes
decision alone.
Looking at Panel B and comparing the results with row 1 in Table 12, we see again that
the results are qualitatively similar. Together, these tables show us that the positive causal
relationship between greater autonomy of mothers and better lower secondary education of
sons is robust to dierences in the specication and denition of MAI. We next turn to
investigate the gender dierences in results.
7 Discussion of Gender Dierences in Results
While dierences in outcome between boys and girls are not new in developing countries,
the reason is often complex and specic to the underlying social, economic and institutional
features. A comprehensive analysis of the conict of gender interests for children is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, one important question in the intra-household resource
allocation is whether boys and girls compete with each other for resources. This eect can
be confounded in the regression analysis comprising the entire sample as no distinction is
made between families with single sex children and families that have both boys and girls
in the secondary school age group. To test this hypothesis, we divide our sample between
mixed-gender sibling families (families with at least one boy and one girl) and single-gender
22See Jensen and Oster (2010) among others.
23sibling families (families with male only or female only siblings). Then we estimate the same
model in (1) separately for them. Results from this estimation have been presented in table
13.23
Please insert Table 13 here
Column 1 shows results for mixed-gender families. These results are qualitatively similar
to that of our main results in table 9. However, for columns 2 and 3, showing results for boys-
only and girls-only families, mother's autonomy is not a signicant variable in explaining
dropout anymore. These results point out the possibility that higher autonomy for mothers,
as opposed to the previous literature, leads to greater resource allocation to young boys
within mixed-gender families.
8 Summary and Policy Implications
We have constructed a new measure of female autonomy to address the issue of whether
children benet more when decisions are taken by the mother than when decisions are taken
by the father within family. Our index of mother's autonomy, constructed using a rich set
of information on spousal decision making from the MxFLS survey seems to fare well in
terms of its associations with variables like education and labor force participation, which
are commonly believed to be determinants of female empowerment.
Using this measure we then analyze the eect of mother's autonomy on child's outcomes.
The past literature predicts signicantly better outcomes for children when mothers have
greater bargaining power, the latter being measured by some changes in income. On the
23We restrict our analysis to Probit estimates in this case, as the sample size is too small for meaningful
IV estimations.
24contrary, our results, based on the direct measure of autonomy, are somewhat mixed. While
mother's autonomy in family decision making lowers dropout rates from secondary school,
boys seem to be the primary benefactors with no similar eect on girls' dropout rates.
Moreover, the results weaken with age of the child and nally disappear for children in the
upper secondary age ranges. Dierences in results between boys and girls seem to come
from the fact that they compete for resources within family and boys get more, even when
the mother has more autonomy in household decision making. In other words, our results
imply that mother's autonomy may not necessarily hasten educational and gender transition
in the process of development and any development policy attempting to reach this goal by
gender-sensitive transfers should take into account the eectiveness of such policy in general
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Table 1: Characteristics of Household Heads in Mexican Family Life Survey 
 

















Age  46.2094  51.8129 47.344 47.4051  54.5806  48.9135 
  (15.1624) (16.5693) (15.6198) (15.5882) (16.1963) (15.9866) 
HH  Size  4.4298 3.4546 4.2322 4.7396 3.9719  4.578 
  (1.9873) (2.0407) (2.0362) (2.2275)  (2.402)  (2.2867) 
Married  Dummy  0.7799  0.1933 0.661 0.7715  0.1786  0.6467 
  (.4144) (.395) (.4734)  (.4199)  (.3831) (.478) 
Secondary  and  Above 0.4177 0.2748 0.3887 0.4288 0.2758 0.3966 
  (.4932) (.4466) (.4875) (.4949)  (.447)  (.4892) 
Working for Last 12 
Months 
0.8843 0.4859 0.8036 0.8581 0.4501 0.7723 
  (.3199) (.5) (.3973)  (.3489)  (.4977)  (.4194) 
Land  Owner  0.2109 0.1393 0.1964 0.1733 0.1159 0.1612 
  (.408)  (.3463) (.3973) (.3785) (.3202) (.3677) 
House  Owner  0.7741 0.7571 0.7706 0.7938 0.7699 0.7888 
  (.4182) (.429) (.4204)  (.4046) (.421) (.4082) 
Observations  6414 1630 8044 6406 1708 8114 31 
 
 
















1. Pooled data for 2002 and 2005 
2. Each cell represents proportion of students enrolled. 
3. Standard Errors are in parenthesis. 






Age All  Male  Female 
5-9 .9602  .969  .9514 
 (.1955)  (.1734)  (.215) 
 3292  1645  1647 
      
10-12 .9723  .9691  .9755 
 (.1642)  (.1731)  (.1548) 
 2704  1359  1345 
      
13-16 .7802  .7925  .7682 
 (.4142)  (.4057)  (.4221) 
 3430  1696  1734 32 
 
Table 3: Mother’s Autonomy in different categories of decision-making 
Note: The mean is the proportion of cases in which the mother decides when we define decision as a 












Mean Std.  Dev. 
 weights  = 
Score/SD
MAI     0  1.63     
Food 0.1249    2.4046  0.6815    0.1832722
Father's clothes  0.1341    1.6016  0.7912    0.1694894
Spouse's clothes  0.0812    2.6334  0.6418    0.1265192
Child clothes  0.4482    1.8556  0.7978    0.5617949
Child education  0.5036    1.8033  0.5749    0.8759784
Child health  0.4896    1.8238  0.5839    0.8384997
Durable expend  0.1961    1.6978  0.5666    0.3460995
Transfer to parents-relative  0.2579    1.4917  0.5705    0.4520596
Transfer to spouse parents-relative  0.2388    1.843  0.7238    0.3299254
Father LFP  0.1307    1.3706 0.5943    0.2199226
Spouse LFP  0.0491    2.0701  0.7937    0.0618622
Contraceptive 0.2901    1.7081 0.5511   0.526401733 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of parents and relation to mother’s autonomy 
 
 
  All  MAI high  MAI low 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
M  Age  16817  36.87  8.84  4210 35.65  8.14  4205 40.25  9.75 
M Sec Edu  16836  0.42  0.49  4210  0.45  0.50  4211  0.32  0.47 
M  Employ  16836  0.26  0.44  4210 0.28  0.45  4211 0.23  0.42 
F  Age  16811  40.50  10.00  4205 39.31  9.42  4202 44.20  10.79 
F Sec Edu  16836  0.46  0.50  4210  0.46  0.50  4211  0.37  0.48 
F  Employ  16836  0.96  0.19  4210 0.97  0.17  4211 0.94  0.24 
Urban  16836  0.55  0.50  4210 0.56  0.50  4211 0.53  0.50 
Note: M represents Mother; F represents Father 34 
 













1.  Standard Errors are in parenthesis. 
2.  The third row in each panel represents numbers of observations.
 MALE    FEMALE 
Age 10-14  15-16    10-14  15-16 
         
MAI high  .9452  .7055    .9256  .7039 
 (.2278)  (.4574)    (.2627)  (.458) 
 511  146    484  152 
         
MAI low  .9267  .6077    .9277  .5896 
 (.261)  (.4896)    (.2593)  (.4931) 
 341  181    401  212 35 
 
Table 6: Determinants of Mother’s Autonomy – First Stage 
Dependent Variable: MAI in 2002 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Relative Proximity  0.102***  0.0922**  0.0998***  0.0805** 
(0.037) (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Mother Education  0.0865***  0.0801***  0.0717***  0.0516*** 
(0.02) (0.02)  (0.021)  (0.016) 
Father Education  -0.0353**  -0.0474***  -0.0435**  -0.0360*** 
(0.017) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.013) 
Urban 0.186*** 
(0.057) 






Constant 0.472***  0.322***  0.284***  0.939***  0.935*** 
(0.078) (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.23)  (0.14) 
Observations 2198  2198  2198  2198  3137 
 











Table 7: Probit Results: Effects of mother’s autonomy on secondary school Enrolment 
 
10-14 10-14 10-14 15-16 15-16 15-16 
All Male  Female  All Male  Female 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MAI  0.0812**  0.158***  0.0179 0.0309 0.0489 0.0140 
(0.041) (0.058) (0.055) (0.040) (0.068) (0.051) 
age  -0.234*** -0.175*** -0.286*** -0.391*** -0.517*** -0.295** 
(0.037) (0.056) (0.050) (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.15) 
Mother Edu  0.140  0.324  0.00234  0.632***  0.712***  0.619*** 
(0.13) (0.20) (0.17) (0.14) (0.21) (0.20) 
Father  Edu  0.421*** 0.492*** 0.470*** 0.411*** 0.620*** 0.241 
(0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.22) (0.19) 
Land  owner 0.0336 -0.174 0.320* -0.0334  0.0486 -0.113 
(0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) (0.19) (0.17) 
Male 0.115  -0.0194 
(0.100) (0.11) 
Constant  4.640*** 3.270*** 4.195*** 5.895*** 8.287*** 4.873** 
(0.61) (0.89) (0.71) (1.66) (2.48) (2.28) 
Observations  1753  826 855 707 325 370 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%37 
 
Table 8: Probit Results: Effects of mother’s autonomy on secondary school dropout 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%













        
MAI  -0.0691 -0.149**  -0.00817 -0.0227  -0.0628 0.00925 
  (0.042) (0.060) (0.057) (0.041) (0.069) (0.053) 
        
age  0.239*** 0.179*** 0.300*** 0.354*** 0.562***  0.174 
  (0.037) (0.058) (0.053)  (0.11)  (0.16) (0.15) 
Mother Edu  -0.129  -0.365*  0.0421  -0.638***  -0.697***  -0.641*** 
  (0.13) (0.21) (0.17) (0.15) (0.22) (0.21) 
Father Edu  -0.453***  -0.538***  -0.505***  -0.339**  -0.588***  -0.144 
  (0.13) (0.19) (0.17) (0.14) (0.23) (0.19) 
Land owner  -0.165  -0.0128  -0.405**  0.0616  0.00785  0.136 
  (0.13) (0.17) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19) (0.18) 
Male -0.149      0.0254     
 (0.10)     (0.11)    
        
Constant  -4.685*** -3.663*** -4.364*** -5.461*** -8.658***  -2.680 
  (0.62) (0.81) (0.75) (1.71) (2.56) (2.33) 
Observations  1716  814 830 671 308 351 38 
 
Table 9: Instrumental variable Results: Effects of mother’s autonomy on secondary 
school Enrolment 
 
10-14 10-14  10-14 
Male Female  All 
(1) (2)  (3) 
MAI 0.891***  -0.749**  0.380 
(0.072) (0.30) (0.60) 
age -0.0658  -0.135  -0.204*** 
(0.064) (0.19) (0.067) 
Mother Edu  0.0468  0.241*  0.106 
(0.17) (0.14)  (0.22) 
Father Edu  0.293*  0.0313  0.234 
(0.16) (0.16)  (0.15) 
Land owner  -0.189  0.0200  -0.105 
(0.14) (0.16)  (0.15) 
urban -0.0658  0.128  0.139 
(0.20) (0.13)  (0.20) 
Male 0.0258 
(0.13) 
Constant 0.527  2.901 3.491** 
(1.25) (2.95)  (1.53) 
Observations 507  517  1024 






Table 10: Instrumental variable Results: Effects of mother’s autonomy on 













Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10% 







      
MAI -0.900***  0.814***  -0.333 
 (0.051)  (0.13)  (0.68) 
      
age 0.0602  0.108  0.213*** 
 (0.052)  (0.13)  (0.068) 
Mother Edu  -0.0504  -0.222*  -0.104 
 (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.22) 
Father Edu  -0.289**  -0.0264  -0.283* 
 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.16) 
Land owner  0.155  0.0150  0.0783 
 (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
urban 0.107  -0.141  -0.151 
 (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.23) 
Male     -0.0366 
     (0.15) 
      
Constant -0.356 -2.430  -3.668** 
 (0.89)  (2.04)  (1.56) 
Observations 502  500  1002 40 
 











Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10% 
   
 Probit  IV 
 Enrol  Dropout  Enrol  Dropout 
        
MAI 0.013**  -0.010**  0.302**  -0.322*** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.134)  (0.075) 
        
Age -0.014***  0.012***  -0.022  0.022 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Mother Edu  0.025  -0.024  0.016  -0.018 
 (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.053)  (0.051) 
Father Edu  0.038**  -0.036**  0.098**  -0.102* 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
Land Owner  -0.015  -0.001  -0.066  0.056 
 (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Urban    -0.022  0.038 
     (0.076)  (0.059) 
        
Observations 826  814 507  502 41 
 
Table 12:  Robustness Checks: Results with 














Notes: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
Dependent variable: Dropout(Male: 10-14 Years) 





MAI -0.126*  -0.952*** 
 (0.07)  (0.055) 
 Panel  B 
MAI -0.0811*  -0.494*** 
 (0.042)  (0.026) 
Observations 795  486 42 
 
Table 13: Sibling sex composition and the Effects of MAI on Retention 
Mixed Sex Sibling  Same Sex Sibling 
10-14 10-14  10-14 
Male Male  Female 
MAI -0.140**  -0.0745  -0.0977 
(0.062) (0.13)  (0.12) 
age 0.133*  0.291***  0.271*** 
(0.073) (0.095)  (0.067) 
Mother Edu  -0.447*  -0.267  0.101 
(0.27) (0.33)  (0.24) 
Father Edu  -0.325  -0.732**  -0.264 
(0.26) (0.35)  (0.25) 
Land owner  0.0132  -0.251  -0.742** 
(0.20) (0.36)  (0.33) 
Constant -2.817***  -4.870***  -4.551*** 
(0.86) (1.19)  (0.85) 
Observations 480  396  399 
 













Appendix Table 1: Reason of Migration (Percent) 
Male Female 
Education/training of any home member  11.44  9.48 
Going back to place of origin  7.03  4.97 
Job of any household member  56.26  40.24 
Marriage/union 4.9  23.27 
Pregnancy 0.05  0.37 
Death of the spouse/couple  0.16  0.33 
Somebody else's death  0.63  1.02 
Own or spouse's/couple's health  1.05  1.11 
Health reasons of somebody else  1.03  1.82 
To be closer to the family  7.31  7.45 
For  insecurity reasons  0.75  0.84 
Because of political issues or disturbances  0.3  0.06 
To be independent from your family  1.28  1.11 
Like that place  2.45  2.21 
Natural disasters  0.4  0.31 
Deported 0.26  0.08 
Other (specify)  4.69  5.34 
Total 4,282  4,886 
 
 
 
 
 
 